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Abstract. People usually is aware of the privacy risks of publishing pho-
tos online, but these risks are less evident when sharing human genomes.
However, modern photos and sequenced genomes are both digital repre-
sentations of real lives. They contain private information that may com-
promise people’s privacy, and still, their highest value is most of times
achieved only when sharing them with others. In this work, we present
an analogy between the privacy aspects of sharing photos and sharing
genomes, which clarifies the privacy risks in the latter. Additionally, we
illustrate an alternative informed model to share genomic data accord-
ing to the privacy-sensitivity level of each portion. This paper is a call to
arms for a collaborative work between geneticists and security experts
to build more effective methods to systematically protect privacy, whilst
promoting the accessibility and sharing of genomes.
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1 Introduction
We live in a world plenty of connected devices and services that stimulate and
simplify data sharing, which promote the acceptance of exposure risks. Nowa-
days, the general public recognizes several privacy risks in sharing photos on the
internet. This was promoted by the public widespread dissemination of some
information leakages that caused severe privacy harms, which made users start
to demand more privacy guarantees to continue sharing their data on platforms
online [14].
Solutions for photo sharing already faced several privacy-related conflicts
and policies changes, and life sciences can learn from them. An analogy between
sharing photos and genomes may increase people’s awareness on privacy risks
and contributes to avoid future leakages that could damage people’s willingness
to share genomic data. We emphasize that this comparison is reasonable since
sequenced genomes and modern photos are digitized records of real lives. Both
contain private information that may compromise people’s privacy, and most of
the times, their highest value is only achieved when shared with others.
Human genome is privacy sensitive since it contains personal information and
researchers need the access to large collections of genomes to accelerate medical
breakthroughs. The ethical appeal for disclosure stimulates altruistic individu-
als to donate biological samples for medical and genomic research. However, this
point of view must coexist with the ethical discussion on the risks to donors’ pri-
vacy and encourage the development of secure models to share genomic data [1].
Privacy and data sharing are not mutually exclusive. Properly discussing and
defending privacy encourages the responsible data sharing and extends donors’
engagement and trust in researches. Recent publications corroborate with the
ideas that clearly informing donors about the privacy risks of their choices does
not affect negatively their willingness in donating samples [12], and that there
is a need for balancing data access and privacy in genomics [19].
In this paper, we propose an analogy between privacy aspects of sharing
photos and sharing genomes, which contributes to clarifying the privacy risks in
the latter. Additionally, we illustrate possible advances in sharing genomes with
an alternative informed model to share genomic data according to the privacy-
sensitivity of their portions. These two contributions promote the accessibility
and sharing of human genomes, whilst advocates their responsible management
considering the privacy of sample donors.
2 An analogy between sharing photos and sharing
genomes
We defined an analogy by comparing the similarities and features of the processes
of sharing photos and sharing genomes, which is based on the following aspects:
– Some portions of data are more privacy-sensitive than others.
– One’s data may affect the privacy of others.
– Systematically detecting the privacy-sensitive portions of data is feasible.
– After classifying the portions, decide how to share them.
– The impact of data sharing is unpredictable.
On each topic, firstly we describe it from the perspective of sharing photos and
then we present the analogy on how does it apply in sharing human genomes.
2.1 Some portions of data are more privacy-sensitive than others
Some elements in photos (e.g., faces and places) may disclose sensitive informa-
tion about the people that own or are depicted in them, such as identity, ancestry,
health, behavior, preference, possession, and location. Similarly, genomes contain
portions of sequences that contain more critical information (e.g. predispositon
to a disease, parental correlation) about their donors and their relatives [15].
Authors of recent publications managed to compromise donors’ privacy by tar-
geting specific portions of human genomes, such as short-tandem repeats [7],
disease-related genes [16], and genomic variations [8]. These elements may dis-
close information, for example, related to identity, ancestry, and health.
2.2 One’s data may affect the privacy of others
Photos portraying other individuals may compromise their privacy, as well as
photos containing elements related to controversial topics may affect the privacy
and safety of owners’ relatives (e.g., [10]). In human genomes, some information
is hereditary (e.g., Y chromosome from father to son), and thus compromising
the privacy of one subject genome can also affect his relatives [15].
2.3 Systematically detecting the privacy-sensitive portions of data
is feasible
Detecting the privacy-sensitive elements in photos includes recognising faces [9],
activities [17], texts [11], signs and other location-specific elements [6]. Recently,
we proposed a method that detects the privacy-sensitive portions of human
genomes by comparing small DNA portions against a knowledge database of
privacy-sensitive genomic sequences [5]. In both cases (photos and genomes), the
detection compares small elements against large databases of known patterns.
Although those detection methods contribute to privacy protection by hidding
sensitive information, the challenges remains mostly in building comprehensive
knowledge databases and querying them efficiently.
2.4 After classifying the portions, decide how to share them
Regarding photo sharing there are two distinct options: (1) enable the share if
the person concludes it does not compromise his/her privacy nor the privacy of
others, and (2) share a portion of the photo, which the person believes it does not
compromise anyone’s privacy, while keeping private or obfuscating the remain-
ing sensitive portions for the general public. Excluding these two options there
is always the possibility to not share the photo. Recent publications proposed
alternative informed models to share photos considering the privacy-sensitivity
of their portions [9, 18]. Similar to photos, every human genome contains some
privacy-sensitive portions. We advocate that sharing certain portions of data is
more attractive than sharing nothing, and those privacy-sensitive portions may
still be shared in a controlled way (e.g., using the cryptographic methods dis-
cussed in [15]). In the next section, we propose an alternative informed model
to share genomic data considering the privacy-sensitivity of their portions.
2.5 The impact of data sharing is unpredictable
Sharing photos may have an immediate impact in the lives of a small number of
people related or depicted on them. However, the global impact of a shared photo
is unpredictable. For instance, a photo can be considered meaningful to history
independently from depicting everyday-life or epic moments. Additionally, sev-
eral quotidian applications we use rely on common user-contributed content, as
well as some news we read depend on participatory journalism. The contribution
of sharing each data is little, but all these incremental collaborations have a huge
impact. The same happens with human genomic data, where the highest value
of photos and genomes is most of times achieved only when sharing them with
others. The individual altruism in contributing to medical and genomic studies
has an extreme importance on the breakthroughs in health-related areas.
3 An informed model to share genomic data
With all the previously mentioned aspects in mind, we call attention to the op-
portunities a hybrid solution can bring to balance data access and privacy of
genomic data [5, 19]. Our proposal is to use the referred detection method [5] to
identify and differentiate the privacy-sensitive sequences of human genomes from
the remaining portions. This enables to keep the small privacy-sensitive portions
(i.e., less than 12%, conservatively [5]) of human genomes under a strict access
control list, and make the remaining portions directly accessible to researchers
and projects, according to the rights defined at their registry in the data repos-
itory. The completeness of this method evidences that there is already a large
body of knowledge on the privacy sensitiveness of human genomes and that the
discovery of novel privacy-sensitive sequences is unlikely using current methods
(e.g., [7, 8, 16]).
3.1 Players and interactions with the model
There are four main players in the ecosystem of genomic data sharing. Sample
donors donate biological material to a sample manager and inform their prefer-
ences on data sharing (if any). Sample managers receive, manipulate, sequence,
store, and provide these biological specimens and their resulting data. Research
projects are study proposals, encompasses one or more researchers, and have
well-defined goals that require access to data associated with specific samples.
Researchers are entities within projects that consume data from the storage
system according to donors preferences and other permission rules. Auditors are
stakeholders (e.g., governments, investors, donors, and data managers) that want
to verify when and which researchers accessed specific data sets.
Donors fill consent forms at their registry to comply with regulations and
to inform their preferences on data sharing. Donors should be free to customize
their informed preferences to state they want to automatically participate in
projects related to specific topics (i.e., a blanket consent). They should also in-
form they want to contribute with their samples to additional specific projects
they sympathize with (i.e., opt-in). Additionally, donors could delegate the de-
cision of participating in which projects to data controllers acting on behalf of
groups of individuals. Exceptionally, donors could separately forbid the use of
the non-sensitive portions of their genomes by specific projects they disagree, or
may require to re-categorise some non-sensitive portions as privacy-sensitive (i.e.,
opt-out). The per-project opt-out dissuades an eventual retraction of all genomes
from the platform if an isolated misuse happens [4]. When a donor dies, the shar-
ing preferences may become open or be kept the same, while his/her relatives
gain the ability to explicitly customize them.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the hybrid data sharing model. This model considers that genomes
have their privacy-sensitive portions differentiated∗ from the remaining ones.
In the envisioned model, researchers should register themselves in the sys-
tem and propose projects that are approved in the same way and with the same
responsibilities it is currently done in biobanks and other repositories. Projects
(i.e., groups of researchers) may start working with all non-sensitive sequences
immediately, must wait for a short period to start using the automatically au-
thorised privacy-sensitive portions, and have the option to request access to the
privacy-sensitive portions of other genomes of interest. The utility of sequenced
data is kept intact to authorised researchers in this model, which complements
other approaches from the literature (e.g., [2]).
3.2 Internal components
This data sharing model can be adapted to different legal, geographic, and or-
ganizational regulations. Additionally, this model, as depicted in Figure 1, is
completely independent of the protocols and technologies necessary to imple-
ment it. In the following, we describe four components that would be of extreme
importance to this model, but others can be integrated to them if needed in the
future.
Evolution module. The knowledge database from the DNA privacy detec-
tor can be automatically updated to address future attacks as new privacy-
sensitive sequences are identified [5]. Thus, the detection method is generic and
evolvable—i.e., it does not become outdated since public databases can be auto-
matically tracked for updates as they evolve. An evolution module in this system
architecture should allow the stored data sets to be re-analyzed at any moment
and attested again for their privacy-sensitivity. As soon as a new privacy-sensitive
sequence is identified, new versions of the data sets can be created, access rules
are adapted accordingly, and the access history is logged for future inquiries.
Storage. Storage components should retain and provide the large amount of ge-
nomic data coming from life-sciences institutions. Storage infrastructures encom-
pass several options from private data centers to public clouds. Data from human
genomes in the envisioned model is stored according to the privacy-sensitivity of
its portions. The privacy-sensitive portions of human genomes must be stored in
infrastructures with appropriate levels of security and dependability, while the
non-sensitive ones may be stored in more affordable infrastructures. Noticeable,
this hybrid model contributes to the cost efficiency of any storage system since
it reduces the percentage of data requiring strong security and dependability
premises.
The level of security and dependability depend on the use of encryption,
information dispersal, data replication, etc. Choosing the best fit is orthogonal
to this model and depends also on the legal constraints defined by regulators
from the region of the sample manager. Restrictive regulations may impede
sending data to infrastructures in other countries, while less restrictive ones
may allow the use of standard encryption and public clouds. For instance, the
storage solution from the BiobankCloud project already considers this range of
options and provides data storage in private repositories, in single public clouds,
and in multiple clouds (i.e., a cloud-of-clouds) [3].
Access control. Access control establishes a differential access to users, ac-
cordingly to their roles and analysis. An access control solution should verify
and permit researchers to access the different portions of the genomes they are
allowed to. Additionally, the access control complements the evolution module
by automatically updating the lists and rules according to the new versions of
datasets.
There are three main factors to authenticate an access request: something the
user knows (e.g., a password), has (e.g., a token), or is (e.g., biometrics). Com-
binations of them can be used to increase the difficulty for an illegitimate user
having access to a resource. For instance, the BiobankCloud platform [3] requires
each user to authenticate with his/her password and an one-time password gen-
erated using a mobile phone or a Yubikey. Additionally, cryptographic solutions
complement access control mechanisms since an attacker that circumvents the
access control does not obtain the data in clear.
Auditability. Auditability is the relative ease of auditing a system or an en-
vironment, acts as a deterrent measure, and complements preventive ones, such
as security, dependability, and privacy-protection. An auditability component
should enable stakeholders to assess at any moment exactly who accessed what
data in a chronological order. Auditors should access only some metadata about
the files, the access logs, and access control rules—i.e., they do not need to access
the whole datasets of genomic data. The auditability component complements
the evolution module by allowing the detection of who has read previous versions
of a data set that was re-analised because it could contain previously unknown
privacy-sensitive sequences. Accountability supplements auditability by ensur-
ing all actors and actions performed on the data have been persistently recorded
as evidence [13]. The system must keep an indelible tamper-proof track of data
accessed by researchers, in order to detect, analyze, and sanction misuses.
4 Final remarks
In this work, we presented an analogy between privacy aspects of sharing photos
and sharing genomes, and proposed an informed model to share genomic data
according to the privacy-sensitivity of their portions. The analogy contributes to
advancing the privacy-perception in sharing genomes by comparing it to some
well-known examples and threats from sharing photos. The informed model mo-
tivates the discussion of novel solutions for sharing genomic data considering
their privacy-sensitivity.
Notwithstanding, there are many open questions (related to this model) that
deserve further investigation and discussion within the community, namely:
– How to provide this data sharing model without incurring in unreasonable
increased management effort?
– How can public clouds be securely used in this model to reduce the costs of
creating and maintaining private storage infrastructures (e.g., in biobanks)?
– Which additional type of genomic data, beyond those discussed in [5], can
be considered privacy-sensitive and should thus be detected?
– There are methods that associate genomic information and photographic
records (e.g., selecting individuals in a database using the association be-
tween specific SNPs and the probability of an individual having brown or
blue eyes [20]). Understanding the impact pf those associations on subjects’
privacy may contribute for more complete protection methods.
Currently, there is a great investment to advance from conventional to pre-
cision medicine, which can succeed only if we embrace genomic data sharing in
a secure and controlled environment. This paper is a call to arms for geneti-
cists and security experts, to work together and build better and more effective
methods to systematically protect privacy, whilst improving the accessibility and
sharing of genomic data.
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